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Abstract: An unprecedented eleven-member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government’s 
argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative 
power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. 
However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent 
from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking 
Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt’s six 
modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have 
featured, in this seminal case.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The highly anticipated decision by the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) in Miller
1
 
comes at a critical constitutional moment. Winding up the UK’s existing relationship with the 
EU will also alter the politically sensitive terms and conditions of the devolution settlement 
between the centre and the regions. It will take years for the full extent of the technical details 
and political consequences to be worked out, if they ever are. For now, the UKSC was called 
upon to provide clarity over two considerations: Westminster’s constitutional entanglement 
with the EU and with the devolved legislatures. The UKSC reached the same conclusions as 
the Divisional Court’s ruling on 3 November 2016 with respect to Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), but it does so from a completely different starting point. With 
respect to EU law, the UKSC makes an unprecedented and audacious statement. With respect 
to devolution, however, it passes up on a pioneering opportunity for the UK’s quasi-federal 
constitution. It is part landmark ruling, and part dispiriting wavering. The implications of 
both aspects of the Court’s intervention will be re-visited for years to come.  
I wish to discuss Miller as an example of the different types of constitutional 
reasoning that were explored by the US scholar Philip Bobbitt in his book on the topic in 
1991. According to Bobbitt, a proper, sound, or legitimate argument is one that uses one of 
the following modalities  
historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); 
textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would 
be interpreted by the average contemporary “man on the street”); structural (inferring 
rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets 
up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from 
those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the 





                                                          
1
 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
2
 P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 12-13. 
These modalities clearly do not translate neatly into the context of the UK’s uncodified 
constitution; but neither does that hurdle render them unusable as a series of deployable 
benchmarks. Aside from the prudential argument, the five main forms are methods of 
interpreting legal texts generally and the text of a constitution in particular. Prudential 
reasoning does not interpret a text, but considers non-textual matters, such as public policy or 
the social costs and benefits of particular decisions. The first four modalities – historical, 
textual, structural, and doctrinal – clearly feature in Miller. In the context of devolution, I will 
argue that the UKSC might have been guided by ethical reasoning. Instead, possibly due to 
concerns about over-politicisation, the UKSC relied on prudential reasons for restraint rather 
than ethical reasons for intervening.  
GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE 
The most astonishing aspect of the Miller decision is the UKSC’s conceptualisation of EU 
law. It marks the culmination of a peculiarly British struggle with the validity of EU law just 
as its application looks set to end. Lord Denning’s ‘construction’ approach in Macarthys v 
Smith
3
 and Lord Bridge’s ‘disapplication’ approach in Factortame4 were practical attempts to 
resolve the question whether to accord priority of application to the national or to the 
European norm. UK courts successfully avoided pronouncing on the priority of validity (an 
obscure and theoretical question) by reiterating that Community law derived its validity from 
a purely domestic source, namely the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA).  
The matter seemed settled until Eleanor Sharpston QC, appearing on behalf of 
Sunderland City Council in Thoburn,
5
 adopted the reasoning in the ECJ’s jurisprudence. She 
argued that EU law took effect in domestic law not because of ‘incorporating’ legislation like 
the ECA, but because of its autonomous status as EU law. Leaning heavily on established 
                                                          
3
 [1981] QB 180. 
4
 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd. (No.2) [1991] 1 AC 603.  
5
 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] QB 151.  
principles of Community law, Ms Sharpston submitted that the Treaty of Rome as amended 
was unlike other international treaties in that it had created a new and unique legal order that 
ranked above the legal systems of the Member States. Upon becoming a member in 1973, the 
UK bowed its head to the supremacy of Community law.
6
 It followed that the validity of EU 
law did not depend upon its incorporation by the ECA, but upon the free-standing doctrines 
of direct effect and supremacy as established in Van Gend en Loos
7
 and Costa v ENEL.
8
 
From the perspective of the UK constitution, the submissions by Ms Sharpston had 
gone rogue. Not only did the arguments recognise a plurality of legal orders, but also a 
plurality of rules of recognition. Furthermore, Ms Sharpston went so far as to assert that ‘so 
long as the UK remains a Member State, the pre-accession model of Parliamentary 
sovereignty is of historical, but not actual, significance.’9 This line of argument was 
summarily rejected as ‘false’ by Laws LJ.10 Almost a decade later, the House of Commons’ 
European Scrutiny Committee, chaired by William Cash MP, remained sufficiently irritated 
by the Divisional Court’s decision in Thoburn to hear evidence on the merits of Ms 
Sharpston’s submissions. In the words of the Committee, these submissions had treated EU 
law as entrenched by virtue of an autonomous principle of EU law rather than incorporated 
by virtue of the ECA. Although the Committee assured itself that ‘the “entrenchment” 
argument made by Sunderland City Council was bold rather than strong’, it clearly feared Ms 
Sharpston’s line of argument as a potent challenge to the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament.
11
 Political reassurances followed in the form of the European Union Act 2011 
(EUA): section 18 reinforced the domestic position that EU law was applicable and effective 
in the UK ‘only by virtue of’ the ECA. The Explanatory Notes to section 18 of the EUA state 
                                                          
6
 ibid at [53]. 
7
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
8
 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; see also Thoburn n 5 above at [55]. 
9
 Submission cited in Thoburn n 5 above at [53]. 
10
 ibid at [58]. 
11
 European Scrutiny Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2010-11, ‘The EU Bill and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty’ 6 December 2010, 27-28. 
This declaratory provision was included in the Act in order to address concerns that 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may in the future be eroded by decisions of 
the courts. By providing in statute that directly effective and directly applicable EU 
law only takes effect in the UK legal order through the will of Parliament and by 
virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 or where it is required to be recognised 
and available in law by virtue of any other Act, this will provide clear authority which 
can be relied upon to counter arguments that EU law constitutes a new higher 
autonomous legal order derived from the EU Treaties or international law and 
principles which has become an integral part of the UK’s legal system independent of 
statute. 
 
The President of the UKSC along with seven colleagues has, intentionally or not, 
thrown that orthodoxy out of the window. Lord Neuberger makes two points. He agrees that 
the ECA gives effect to the Treaty of Rome and is the source of EU law. That is to say, EU 
law originates from the institutions of the European Union, and then becomes effective in UK 
law via the gateway of the ECA. But instead of leaving it there he goes on to say that, more 
fundamentally and more realistically, ‘it is the EU institutions which are the relevant source 
of that law.’ For as long as the ECA remains in force, the entire acquis communautaire, ie, 
the EU Treaties, EU legislation, and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, ‘are direct 
sources of UK law.’12 In other words, the validity of EU law does not originate from the 
ECA. Instead, the effect of the Act is to ‘constitute’ (a better term would be ‘to recognise’) 
EU law as ‘an independent and overriding source of domestic law.’13 Should this make you 
blink twice, the UKSC repeats the point by positing EU law ‘as an entirely new, independent 
and overriding source of domestic law, and the Court of Justice as a source of binding 
judicial decisions about its meaning.’14  
The consequences of referring to the EU as an independent and overriding source of 
law are three-fold. First, after decades of paying lip-service to sovereignty,
15
 preserving ‘the 
                                                          
12
 Miller n 1 above at [60]-[61]. 
13
 ibid at [65]. 
14
 ibid at [80]. 
15
 M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 71. 
formal veneer of Diceyan orthodoxy while undermining its substance’,16 and statutorily 
fastening the existing relationship between EU law and UK domestic law,
17
 the highest court 
in the UK has let the EU genie out of the bottle. It appears to have defied the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty by aligning its case law with the ECJ’s famous words in Costa that 
‘…the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its 
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions…’18 
Secondly, this recognition of the EU as a source of law allows the UKSC to reject the 
Government’s claims that EU membership merely results in changes to domestic law ‘from 
time to time’ as provided for under section 2(1) of the ECA. Contrary to four decades of 
judicial precedent and the statutory prescription in section 18 of the EUA, the UKSC holds 
that withdrawal would give effect to ‘a fundamental change in the constitutional 
arrangements of the United Kingdom’.19  
Finally, the UKSC claims the constitutional high ground by recognising EU law as an 
independent source of domestic law. The majority establishes a clear link between the 
triggering of Article 50 of the TEU, the loss of a domestic source of law, which represents a 
fundamental constitutional change, and the resulting need for statutory authorisation. In so 
arguing, the Court torpedoes the Government’s comparatively unsophisticated link between 
triggering Article 50, which will merely alter UK foreign relations, and therefore falls 
squarely within its prerogative power. Interestingly, neither does the UKSC follow the legal 
reasoning of the Divisional Court, which linked the triggering of Article 50 to the inevitable 
and irretrievable loss of certain individual rights guaranteed under EU law.  
                                                          
16
 P.P. Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom after Factortame’ (1991) Yearbook of European Law 221, 
251 
17
 The Explanatory Notes to the EUA, referred to above, make clear that EUA, s 18 ‘does not alter the existing 
relationship between EU law and UK domestic law; in particular, the principle of the primacy of EU law.’ 
18
 Costa n 8 above, 594. 
19
 Miller n 1 above at [78]. 
I do not wish to push the point too far. I am not saying that the UKSC’s dicta have 
effected a ‘technical revolution’ by departing from the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty.
20
 Indeed, the UKSC is adamant that the recognition of EU law as a domestic 
source does not result in a change to the rule of recognition: Parliament can repeal the ECA at 
any point in time.
21
 But enhancing the status of EU law forms the basis of the UKSC’s 
‘structural’ argument (in Bobbitt’s terms). The Court embellishes the domestic constitutional 
architecture through the innovative step of recognising EU law as source. It then infers that 
the loss of that source would require statutory authorisation. The conclusion is indeed reached 
via ‘the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to the present case’.22 
However, the UKSC’s starting point is far from ordinary in a doctrinal sense. 
The Government’s lawyers did not help their case by placing a weak argument at its 
core. This rested on the absence of any provision in the ECA that curtailed ministers’ 
prerogative powers to withdraw from international treaties. It followed, the Government 
claimed, that withdrawing from the EU Treaties under the prerogative was not precluded by 
the ECA.
23
 Lord Reed agrees with this position: since the ECA does not require the UK to be 
a member of the EU, it also does not affect the Government’s power to begin the process of 
withdrawal without an Act of Parliament.
24
 However, the Government’s argument was 
ultimately deemed insubstantial in that it tried to prove a negative by transforming absence of 
evidence into positive proof of its existence. It was roundly rejected with words that echo 
                                                          
20
 H.W.R. Wade, ‘Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 568-575. 
21
 Miller n 1 above at [61]. 
22
 ibid at [82]. 
23
 ibid at [85]; accepted by Lord Reed (dissenting) at [161]: ‘Since there is no statute which requires the decision 
under article 50(1) to be taken by Parliament, it follows that it can lawfully be taken by the Crown, in the 
exercise of the prerogative.’ (See also [194]).  
24
 ibid at [177]. 
Lord Camden’s famous dictum in Entick v Carrington:25 ‘… unless that Act positively 
created such a power in relation to those Treaties, it does not exist’.26 
Miller was widely billed as a case of great constitutional importance – and in relation 
to EU law it undoubtedly breaks new ground. But in holding that legislative authority is 
required for the exercise of political power it merely serves as the kind of constitutional 
reminder that courts occasionally hand out to governments. Moreover, although the UKSC 
upholds the Divisional Court’s ruling it does not do so for the same reasons. The question for 
the Divisional Court involved the inevitable and irrevocable loss of individual rights once the 
Article 50 negotiations had run their course.
27
 The outcome of that case was effectively pre-
determined by 400 years of consistent case law dating back to the Case of Proclamations,
28
 
and the court said nothing about the constitutional quality of EU law. In contrast, the UKSC 
says almost nothing about individual rights.
29
 The different approach is of little practical 
significance. The courts’ conclusions are the same irrespective of whether triggering Art 50 
results in the loss of rights or in the loss of a source of law: such a ‘a major change to UK 
constitutional arrangements’ cannot be achieved solely by executive fiat.30  
BOTTLING UP THE DEVOLUTION QUESTION 
The second question before the UKSC related to the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
(NIA), and whether they required the agreement of the devolved legislature before notice 
under Article 50 could be given. The UKSC conceded that because it had already found that 
an Act of Parliament was required to authorise notification the devolution question had either 
                                                          
25
 (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029: ‘…if this is law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever 
existed in this country…’  
26
 Miller n 1 above at [86].  
27
 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) at [57]-[66]. 
28
 (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; see also R (Miller) ibid at [26]: ‘This subordination of the Crown (i.e. the executive 
government) to law is the foundation of the rule of law in the United Kingdom. It has its roots well before the 
war between the Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century but was decisively confirmed in the 
settlement arrived at with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and has been recognised ever since.’ 
29
 See only Miller n 1 above at [76]-[79]. 
30
 ibid at [82] 
been superseded or become less significant. As a result, it holds that the provisions of the 
NIA are not constructive to the case, and that the Sewel Convention does not give rise to a 
legally enforceable obligation.  
One way of interpreting the UKSC’s response to the devolution question combines 
Bobbitt’s textual interpretation with his idea of prudential reasons for restraint. The Court’s 
unanimous rejection of the devolution question reads like a reassertion of the English 
principle of absolute legislative supremacy that traces back to Blackstone and Dicey. Such 
legalism must be understood in light of a political atmosphere in which the UKSC was 
momentarily under the spotlight and perhaps anxious not to over-politicise the devolution 
question. It may, therefore, have been judicious to bottle up the devolution question for a later 
day.  
The UKSC’s textualism arguably sends a chilling message to the regions. First, with 
respect to EU relations, the UKSC holds that the devolution legislation in Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland assumes that the UK would be a member of the EU, but does not 
require the UK to remain a member.
31
 Constitutionally, EU relations are an ‘excepted’ 
matter
32
 or reserved to Westminster.
33
 It follows that there can be no ‘parallel legislative 
competence’ by which the devolved legislatures could withdraw from the EU.34  
Moreover, the UKSC adopts a technical understanding of the Sewel Convention, 
which is the mechanism by which the UK Parliament constrains its formal power to legislate 
on matters that have been devolved to the regions.
35
 Curiously, the Sewel Convention exists 
in two forms: as an uncodified constitutional convention for Northern Ireland, and in 
                                                          
31
 ibid at [129]. 
32
 NIA, Sched 2. 
33
 Scotland Act 1998, s 30(1) and para 7(1) of Sched 5; Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108(4) and Pt 1, 
Sched 7. 
34
 Miller n 1 above at [130]. 
35
 NIA, s 5(6); Scotland Act 1998, s 28(7); Government of Wales Act 2006, s 107(5). 
statutory form for Scotland and Wales. The Smith Commission was established in the 
aftermath of the Scottish Independence referendum of 2014 to create a stronger and more 
autonomous Scottish Parliament. It proposed that ‘the Sewel Convention … be put on a 
statutory footing’.36 The Scotland Act 2016 inserted this recommendation into the 1998 Act,37 
and the Wales Act 2017 has now similarly amended the Government of Wales Act 2006.
38
 
The infringement of a convention usually attracts political consequences (eg, loss of office), 
but not any legal penalty imposed by a court of law. But what happens in the case of a 
convention that has been inserted into an Act of Parliament? Does its statutory form grant the 
courts jurisdiction over its scope and meaning?  
The UKSC unanimously rejects this view. The Sewel Convention is ‘a statement of 
political intent [that does] not create legal obligations.’39 The purpose of recognising the 
convention in statutory form was to ‘entrench’ it, ie, give it greater political weight, as a 
convention.
40
 The UKSC’s jurisdiction is entirely passive: ‘the policing of its scope and the 
manner of its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the judiciary’.41 Applied 
to the present case, section 1 of the NIA
42
 provides only that Northern Ireland shall not cease 
to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland.
43
 The giving of notice under Article 50 has no bearing on section 1 of the NIA. As a 
result, the UK Parliament could in law unilaterally alter the structure of the devolution 
                                                          
36
 Smith Commission, ‘Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’, 27 November 2014, at [22]. 
37
 Scotland Act 1998, s 28(8) as amended by Scotland Act 2016, s 2(2).  
38
 Wales Act 2017 s 2. 
39
 Miller n 1 above at [139]. 
40
 ibid at [149]. 
41
 ibid at [151]. 
42
 NIA, s 1 reads ‘(1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United 
Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting 
in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1.  
(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the 
United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such 
proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.’ 
43
 Miller n 1 above at [135] and [157]. 




In a critical section in Miller, the UKSC discusses the rights conferred on the citizens 
of Northern Ireland by the NIA, eg, to judicially review the Executive or the Assembly where 
EU law has been breached.
45
 The impending loss or diminution of individual rights could 
have provoked a strongly-worded statement – as it did for the Divisional Court in Miller. But 
voicing concerns about future changes is hampered by the UKSC’s textual approach. This 
part of the judgement is characterised by lack of certainty and cautious language: statutory 
rights would ‘normally’ not be removed by prerogative powers; and it would be 
‘incongruous’ if the EU law requirements in the NIA were removed other than by statute.46 
On the specific question whether the NIA requires specific legislation before Article 50 is 
required, the UKSC deems it ‘not necessary to reach a definitive view’ and refrains from 
finally deciding this question of constitutional law.
47
 The UKSC’s unanimous approach to 
textual interpretation in the context of devolution reflects a distinct loss of confidence: it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that the judges did not want to determine the devolution 
question. 
On another day, it might have combined structural reasoning with (to recall Bobbitt’s 
fifth modality) ethical motives for intervening. Since 1998, the ethos of the UK constitution 
has shifted from that of a unitary state with centralised government to that of a quasi-federal 
state with devolved administration. These new and evolving constitutional arrangements give 
rise to ethical arguments, which recognise that certain rights, obligations, and interests lie 
outwith the power of any one government. Ethical and structural arguments are similar in one 
respect: neither depends ‘on the construction of any particular piece of text, but rather on the 
                                                          
44
 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(2)(d); Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108(6)(c); NIA, s 6(2)(d). 
45
 NIA s 6(2)(d) and s 24(1).  
46
 Miller n 1 above at [132]. 
47
 ibid at [132]. 
necessary relationships that can be inferred from the overall arrangement expressed in the 
text’.48 The modality of ethical argument would have allowed the UKSC to draw on broader 
commitments that are reflected in the UK’s constitutional settlement, such as the NIA. Borne 
of the Belfast Agreement,
49
 it was signed by the leaders of eight political parties and by the 
heads of the British and Irish Governments, and subsequently put before the electorates of 
both Northern Ireland and of the Republic of Ireland for approval. A number of observations 
follow from this starting point.  
First, in the earlier House of Lords decision of Robinson v Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland,
50
 Lords Hoffmann and Bingham (respectively) expressly refer to the NIA 
as ‘a constitution for Northern Ireland’,51 which means that ‘the provisions should, 
consistently with the language used, be interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in 
mind the values which the constitutional provisions are intended to embody’.52  
Secondly, the Good Friday Agreement was supported by a referendum held 
simultaneously in Northern Ireland (71.1 per cent in favour) and in the Republic of Ireland 
(94.4 per cent in favour). The holding of a referendum could have been seen by the UKSC 
Justices in Miller as establishing a principle that there would be no change to NI’s 
constitutional status without the consent of its citizens.  
Thirdly, instead of reiterating doctrinal Westminster-centric notions of sovereignty, 
the UKSC could have conceived of the relationship between the centre and the regions with 
reference to these wider constitutional considerations. The UKSC could have built on its view 
that the loss of EU law amounts to a fundamental change to the UK constitution to express 
concern that such a loss would destabilise cooperation in the North-South Ministerial Council 
                                                          
48
 Bobbitt, n 2 above, 20. 
49
 Cm.3883 (April 1998).  
50
 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32; [2002] NI 390. 
51
 ibid at [25] per Lord Hoffmann. 
52
 ibid at [11] per Lord Bingham (emphasis added). 
as established under the Belfast and British-Irish Agreements.
53
 This institution has a wide 
remit which certainly can include implementation of certain EU policies and programmes on 
an all-Ireland and on a cross-border basis. The observance and implementation of EU law is 
expressly a ‘transferred matter’,54 and as such forms part of the responsibilities of the 
devolved administration in Northern Ireland. A reasonable case can be made that 
Westminster legislation that amended those provision in ways that affected the ‘complex 
power-sharing’ arrangements55 between the Republic of Ireland, the devolved administrations 
and legislatures, and the UK would not fall under the Sewel Convention and would, 
therefore, require the consent of the devolved legislatures.  
From the UKSC’s perspective, therefore, the Sewel Convention is the key 
constitutional mechanism by which boundary questions between the centre and the regions 
are framed. The UKSC recognises that some conventions perform ‘a fundamental role in the 
operation of our constitution’, and the particular function of the Sewel Convention is to 
facilitate ‘harmonious relationships’ between the centre and the regions.57 It acts as the key to 
an interlocking and interdependent constitutional structure. It can be used as the mouthpiece 
for cross-community and cross-border dialogue. However, the Sewel Convention creates no 
legal obligations, and the UKSC will not police the fundamental role that the convention 
plays, notwithstanding its statutory form.  
The UKSC is speaking here in the coded language of political constitutionalism and, 
by prioritising prudential reasons for judicial restraint over ethical reasons for intervening, 
sending out mixed messages. The need for judicial restraint is matched by a clarion call to 
                                                          
53
 The Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland Office, 10 April 1998.  
54
 Section 6(1)(d) NIA 1998. 
55
 B. O’Leary, ‘Complex Power-Sharing in and over Northern Ireland: A Self-determination Agreement, a 
Treaty, a Consociation, a Federacy, Matching Confederal Institutions, Intergovernmentalism, and a Peace 
Process’, in M. Weller and B. Metzger (eds), Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in 
Theory and Practice (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 
57
 Miller n 1 above at [151]. 
Westminster MPs to pay heed to the complexities of a new, evolving, and fragmented 
constitution. English politicians are still prone to refer to the UK as a unitary or as a 
centralised state based on the traditional Westminster model of government.
59
 The political 
reality, however, is that devolution has already transformed the UK’s unitary system of 
government ‘irreversibly’ and will continue to evolve.60 As Brigid Hadfield noted in 2011: 
Any idea that the sovereignty of Westminster may here be regarded as the unilateral 
assertion of the UK Parliament’s legal powers does not fit the political reality. The 
embedded relationship between the governments of the UK and Ireland, and the 
requirements of the 1998 model of devolution, agreed by the Northern Ireland and 
Irish Republic, regarding the fullest expression within Northern Ireland of both the 





Given the approach it adopted to the issue, the UKSC is undoubtedly correct that the consent 
of the devolved legislatures is not strictly speaking required for the purposes of triggering 
Article 50 – or for the purposes of amending the devolution legislation. However, for so long 
as the Sewel Convention is in place, the devolved assemblies need to pass a legislative 
consent motion under the Sewel Convention before those parts of the devolution legislation 
incorporating EU law can be amended. True to British form, recognising this as a 
constitutional requirement is very different from giving it any legal effect.  
In trying to defuse one political bomb by not over-politicising devolution the UKSC 
may find that it has ignited at least another one. The UKSC’s self-perceived need for restraint 
will be interpreted in the regions as a retreat to constitutional formalism and Westminster 
intransigence. Withdrawing from the EU will certainly alter the general and special 
                                                          
59
 Chancellor Philip Hammond: ‘This is a United Kingdom issue and the will of the people of the United 
Kingdom was to leave. We’re clear that we can’t have a different deal or a different outcome for different parts 
of the United Kingdom’, quoted in ‘Chancellor Philip Hammond dashes Nicola Sturgeon's hope of bespoke 
Brexit deal for Scotland’, The Herald, 1 December 2016.  
60
 House of Commons Justice Committee Fifth Report, ‘Devolution: A Decade On’ Session 2008-9 at [4]. 
61
 B. Hadfield, ‘Devolution: A National Conversation?’, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2011) 234. 
arrangements of the Northern Irish peace process. Moreover, the outcome of the Northern 
Ireland assembly elections in March 2017 throws down the gauntlet for the future of political 
power-sharing and joint government. Elsewhere, the Miller decision allows the SNP to 
proclaim that the Smith Commission’s promises to enhance the Sewel Convention are ‘not 
worth the paper they were written on’, and that Scotland cannot be an equal partner in the UK 
so long as its ‘voice is simply not being heard or listened to within the UK’.62  
A better reading of Miller suggests that the impact assessment of EU withdrawal on 
devolution is, for now at least, one for constitutional politics rather than constitutional law. 
Westminster politicians will need to step up and implement what the UK constitution 
requires. For now that involves squaring the English principle of sovereignty with the written 
constitutions of the regions and the result of EU referendum. At some point in the future it 
will additionally implicate the European institutions, the Member States, and especially the 
Republic of Ireland. And at some other point in the future, it may well involve again a 
differently-constituted and differently-minded UKSC.  
OLD WINE IN OLD BOTTLES 
Lord Reed’s dissent with respect to Article 50 is premised on two assumptions. First, the 
giving of notification under Article 50(2) does not in itself alter any laws in force in the UK; 
it merely initiates a process of negotiation. Second, ministers of the Crown are politically 
accountable to Parliament for the manner in which this prerogative power is exercised. With 
respect to the latter premise, Lord Reed’s reasoning may be described as ‘historical’. He 
appears to adopt a 19
th
 century understanding of how the English constitution is supposed to 
work. The dicta reveal his faith in, rather than a constitutional commitment to, the 
parliamentary process. He says it is ‘open’ to Parliament to authorise and debate the exercise 
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of the prerogative power;
64
 at the end of the negotiation process, the procedures of the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 ‘are likely to apply’; and, in any case, 




Lord Reed’s dissent with respect to the ECA is similarly grounded on a tried and 
tested understanding of the relationship between EU and national law. First, contrary to the 
majority view, Lord Reed asserts that EU law is not an independent source of law, but is 
rather dependent on the UK’s rule of recognition.67 Second, the ECA is a gateway statute that 
gives effect to the acquis communautaire, but it does not create the kind of rights and 
obligations that other statutes do.
68
 Lord Reed draws a distinction between the validity of the 
Treaties as a matter of EU law and their application to the UK as a matter of domestic law. If 
the Treaties cease to apply as a matter of international law (to which the prerogative power 
applies), then there are no rights, powers etc which could be given legal effect in the UK in 
accordance with the Treaties. In other words, there is no obligation to give effect to EU law 
merely because it is directly effective. The ECA is not an independent source of law. It 
simply gives rise to a ‘scheme’ by which domestic law dynamically reflects the UK’s 
changing obligations under EU law. That obligation ceases when the Treaties no longer 
apply.
69
 Lord Reed’s dissent errs on the side of orthodoxy.  
There is nothing wrong with orthodoxy when it is backed up by doctrinal argument. 
There is little to distinguish Lord Reed’s conceptualisation of EU law from earlier judicial 
articulations, especially Laws LJ’s decision in Thoburn, and Lords Neuberger and Mance’s 
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(with which Lord Reed agreed) in HS2.
70
 It is not Lord Reed’s dissent that is surprising, but 
the position taken by Lords Neuberger and Mance for the majority. 
CONCLUSION 
The UKSC has opened up one bottle and put the cap on another. It has certainly broken some 
old ones in the process of referring to EU law as an independent and overriding source. But it 
has also placed another message in a bottle for politicians to decipher, and for future courts to 
re-open when they come to assessing the legal and constitutional impact of amending the 
devolution legislation with respect to the EU. The UKSC’s approach provides further 
evidence for the aptness of Hegel’s famous remark about the owl of Minerva spreading her 
wings only with the falling of the dusk.
71
 It is only as the UK’s membership of the EU comes 
to an end that the domestic courts are starting to characterise EU law in line with the Court of 
Justice’s own understanding. Conversely, as the UK starts to re-constitute itself outside the 
EU, domestic politicians are being called on to square Westminster’s ancient model of 
government in accordance with the contemporary requirements of constitutional pluralism. 
Failure to do so is likely to shatter the United Kingdom as a state. The Government may have 
secured a unanimous win on the legality of the domestic power balance but time will reveal it 
to be little more than a Pyrrhic victory. 
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